April 28, 2004


The staff of the Committee on Open Government is authorized to issue advisory opinions. The ensuing staff advisory opinion is based solely upon the information presented in your correspondence.


I have received your letter in which you asked whether you must appeal a denial of access for records or whether you may "file a mandamus motion with a court without being in violation of not having exhausted administrative remedies."

I believe that an initial denial of access must be appealed and that the appeal must be denied in order to exhaust one’s administrative remedies. When that occurs, a judicial proceeding may be initiated.

By way of background, the Freedom of Information Law provides direction concerning the time and manner in which agencies must respond to requests and appeals. Specifically, §89(3) of the Freedom of Information Law states in part that:

"Each entity subject to the provisions of this article, within five business days of the receipt of a written request for a record reasonably described, shall make such record available to the person requesting it, deny such request in writing or furnish a written acknowledgement of the receipt of such request and a statement of the approximate date when such request will be granted or denied..."

If neither a response to a request nor an acknowledgement of the receipt of a request is given within five business days, or if an agency delays responding for an unreasonable time after it acknowledges that a request has been received, a request may, in my opinion, be considered to have been constructively denied. In such a circumstance, I believe that the denial may be appealed in accordance with §89(4)(a) of the Freedom of Information Law. That provision states in relevant part that:

"...any person denied access to a record may within thirty days appeal in writing such denial to the head, chief executive, or governing body, who shall within ten business days of the receipt of such appeal fully explain in writing to the person requesting the record the reasons for further denial, or provide access to the record sought."

I note that it has been held that when an appeal is made but a determination is not rendered within ten business days of the receipt of the appeal as required under §89(4)(a) of the Freedom of Information Law, the appellant has exhausted his or her administrative remedies and may initiate a challenge to a constructive denial of access under Article 78 of the Civil Practice Rules [Floyd v. McGuire, 87 AD 2d 388, appeal dismissed 57 NY 2d 774 (1982)].

Further, the regulations promulgated by the Committee on Open Government (21 NYCRR Part 1401), which govern the procedural aspects of the Law, state that:

"(a) The governing body of a public corporation or the head, chief executive or governing body of other agencies shall hear appeals or shall designate a person or body to hear appeals regarding denial of access to records under the Freedom of Information Law.

(b) Denial of access shall be in writing stating the reason therefor and advising the person denied access of his or her right to appeal to the person or body established to hear appeals, and that person or body shall be identified by name, title, business address and business telephone number. The records access officer shall not be the appeals officer" (section 1401.7).

Lastly, I point out that the state's highest court has held that a failure to inform a person denied access to records of the right to appeal enables that person to seek judicial review of a denial. Citing the Committee's regulations and the Freedom of Information Law, the Court of Appeals in Barrett v. Morgenthau held that:

"[i]nasmuch as the District Attorney failed to advise petitioner of the availability of an administrative appeal in the office (see, 21 NYCRR 1401.7[b]) and failed to demonstrate in the proceeding that the procedures for such an appeal had, in fact, even been established (see, Public Officers Law [section] 87[1][b], he cannot be heard to complain that petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies" [74 NY 2d 907, 909 (1989)].

I point out, too, that the lower court in Floyd, supra, determined that the records should have been disclosed by virtue of the agency's failure to respond, but that the Appellate Division modified that aspect of the decision. Although the Appellate Division confirmed that a failure to respond to an appeal within the statutory time constitutes a constructive denial of access, thereby resulting in the exhaustion of one's administrative remedies and the right to initiate an Article 78 proceeding, it was also found that such failure did not automatically require that the agency disclose the requested records. Specifically, in rejecting the Supreme Court's automatic grant of access, the Appellate Division found that:

"We think this is too rigid an interpretation of the statute. As a textual matter, if the effect of failure to comply were as Special Term interpreted it, it would have been more appropriate for the statute to say that if (A) the agency did not furnish the explanation in writing then (B) the agency must provide access to the material sought. Instead, however, the statute is phrased in the alternative form of requiring the agency within seven days to do either (A) or (B). As a textual matter there would appear to be no particular reason to say that failure to do either (A) or (B) would require the agency to do (B) rather than (A), which is the choice Special Term made.

"More important, as a policy matter, we do not think the statute should be interpreted so rigidly to require the result directed by Special Term. We recognize the importance of prompt response by the agency to the request for information. Such responsiveness and accountability are the very point of FOIL. But the same statute also expresses the public policy that some kinds of material should be exempt from disclosure. Both policies must be considered. To say that even the slightest default in timely explanation destroys the exemption seems to us too draconian. We think the seven-day limitation should be read as directory rather than mandatory, and that the consequence of failure by the agency to comply with the seven-day limitation is that the applicant will be deemed to have exhausted his administrative remedies and will be entitled to seek his judicial remedy" (id., 87 AD 2d 388, 390).

I note that at the time of the decision, the statutory time for responding to an appeal was seven days; it is now ten business days.

I hope that I have been of assistance.


Executive Director


BY: Janet M. Mercer
Administrative Professional