FOIL-AO-14737

June 15, 2004

E-MAIL

TO:

FROM: Robert J. Freeman, Executive Director

The staff of the Committee on Open Government is authorized to issue advisory opinions. The ensuing staff advisory opinion is based solely upon the facts presented in your correspondence.

Dear

As you are aware, I have received your letter. You have requested an advisory opinion concerning the following matter;

"Assume that a plaintiff in a personal injury action brought a case against the City of New York for damages on account of negligence in the ownership of a road in the City of New York. The case settled. A settlement agreement is entered into by the plaintiff and the Defendant, the City of New York. The attorney for the City of New York want [sic] to insert a confidentiality clause in the settlement agreement barring disclosure of the terms of the settlement agreement. Assume further that the funding of the settlement will come from an insurance policy of a contractor who was actually doing the road work."

You have asked whether the City must "disclose the settlement agreement pursuant to a FOIL request despite the existence of a confidentiality clause in the agreement."

From my perspective, based on the language of the Freedom of Information Law and its judicial construction, a "confidentiality clause" is irrelevant in considering rights of access. In this regard, I offer the following comments.

It is noted at the outset that it has been held in variety of circumstances that a promise or assertion of confidentiality cannot be upheld, unless a statute specifically confers confidentiality. In Gannett News Service v. Office of Alcoholism and Substance Abuse Services [415 NYS 2d 780 (1979)], a state agency guaranteed confidentiality to school districts participating in a statistical survey concerning drug abuse. The court determined twenty five years ago that the promise of confidentiality could not be sustained, and that the records were available, for none of the grounds for denial appearing in the Freedom of Information Law could justifiably be asserted. In a decision rendered by the Court of Appeals, it was held that a state agency's:

"long-standing promise of confidentiality to the intervenors is irrelevant to whether the requested documents fit within the Legislature's definition of 'record' under FOIL. The definition does not exclude or make any reference to information labeled as 'confidential' by the agency; confidentiality is relevant only when determining whether the record or a portion of it is exempt..." [Washington Post v. Insurance Department, 61 NY 2d 557, 565 (1984)].

Second, I believe that the agreement must be disclosed. As a general matter, the Freedom of Information Law is based upon a presumption of access. Stated differently, all records of an agency are available, except to the extent that records or portions thereof fall within one or more grounds for denial appearing in §87(2)(a) through (i) of the Law. Unless records may justifiably be withheld in accordance with one or more of the grounds for denial, a claim, a promise or an agreement to maintain confidentiality would, based on judicial decisions, be meaningless.

In Geneva Printing Co. v. Village of Lyons (Supreme Court, Wayne County, March 25, 1981), a public employee charged with misconduct and in the process of an arbitration hearing engaged in a settlement agreement with a municipality. One aspect of the settlement was an agreement to the effect that its terms would remain confidential. Notwithstanding the agreement of confidentiality, which apparently was based on an assertion that "the public interest is benefitted by maintaining harmonious relationships between government and its employees", the court found that no ground for denial could justifiably be cited to withhold the agreement. In so holding, the court cited a decision rendered by the Court of Appeals and stated that:

"In Board of Education v. Areman, (41 NY2d 527), the Court of Appeals in concluding that a provision in a collective bargaining agreement which bargained away the board of education's right to inspect personnel files was unenforceable as contrary to statutes and public policy stated: 'Boards of education are but representatives of the public interest and the public interest must, certainly at times, bind these representatives and limit or restrict their power to, in turn, bind the public which they represent. (at p. 531).

"A similar restriction on the power of the representatives for the Village of Lyons to compromise the public right to inspect public records operates in this instance.

"The agreement to conceal the terms of this settlement is contrary to the FOIL unless there is a specific exemption from disclosure. Without one, the agreement is invalid insofar as restricting the right of the public to access."

It was also found that the record indicating the terms of the settlement constituted a final agency determination available under the Law [ see FOIL, §87(2)(g)(iii)]. The decision states that:

"It is the terms of the settlement, not just a notation that a settlement resulted, which comprise the final determination of the matter. The public is entitled to know what penalty, if any, the employee suffered...The instant records are the decision or final determination of the village, albeit arrived at by settlement..."

In another decision, the matter involved the subject of a settlement agreement with a town that included a confidentiality clause who brought suit against the town for disclosing the agreement under the Freedom of Information Law. In considering the matter, the court stated that:

"Plaintiff argues that provisions of FOIL did not mandate disclosure in this instance. However, it is clear that any attempt to conceal the financial terms of this expenditure would violate the Legislative declaration of §84 of the Public Officer’s Law, as it would conceal access to information regarding expenditure of public monies.

"Although exceptions to disclosure are provided in §§87 and 89, plaintiff has not met his burden of demonstrating that the financial provisions of this agreement fit within one of these statutory exceptions (see Matter of Washington Post v New York State Ins. Dept. 61 NY2d 557, 566). While partially recognized in Matter of LaRocca v Bd. of Education, 220 AD2d 424, those narrowly defined exceptions are not relevant to defendants’ disclosure of the terms of a financial settlement (see Matter of Western Suffolk BOCES v Bay Shore Union Free School District, ___AD2d___ 672 NYS2d 776). There is no question that defendants lacked the authority to subvert FOIL by exempting information from the enactment by simply promising confidentiality (Matter of Washington Post, supra p567).

"Therefore, this Court finds that the disclosure made by the defendant Supervisor was ‘required by law’, whether or not the contract so provided" (Hansen v. Town of Wallkill, Supreme Court, Orange County, December 9, 1998).

In short, absent the assertion of a ground for denial appearing in §87(2) of the Freedom of Information Law, and none in my view would apply, I believe that the agreement must be disclosed in response to a request made under the Freedom of Information Law, notwithstanding the language regarding confidentiality in the agreement.

I hope that I have been of assistance.

RJF:tt