August 9, 2006


The staff of the Committee on Open Government is authorized to issue advisory opinions. The ensuing staff advisory opinion is based solely upon the information presented in your correspondence.


I have received your letter and the materials attached to it. In brief, you requested a variety of records from the Town of Hartsville relating to the development of a windfarm. Although some records were made available, others, particularly certain email communications and documentation concerning a public opinion survey about the development, were not disclosed. Although the Supervisor indicated that no email communications prior to August of 2005 exist, you wrote that the project had been in development since early 2004 or perhaps earlier. You also wrote that you asked that the Supervisor certify that the records no longer exist, but that as of the date of your letter, there had been no response.

In this regard, I offer the following comments.

First and most significantly, the scope of the Freedom of Information Law is expansive, for it encompasses all government agency records within its coverage. Section 86(4) of that statute defines the term "record" expansively to include:

"any information kept, held, filed, produced, reproduced by, with or for an agency or the state legislature, in any physical form whatsoever including, but not limited to, reports, statements, examinations, memoranda, opinions, folders, files, books, manuals, pamphlets, forms, papers, designs, drawings, maps, photos, letters, microfilms, computer tapes or discs, rules, regulations or codes."

Based upon the language quoted above, documentary materials need not be in the physical possession of an agency, such as a town, to constitute agency records; so long as they are produced, kept or filed for an agency, the law specifies and the courts have held that they constitute "agency records", even if they are maintained apart from an agency’s premises.

In a decision rendered by the Court of Appeals, the state's highest court, it was found that materials received by a corporation providing services for a branch of the State University pursuant to a contract were kept on behalf of the University and constituted agency "records" falling within the coverage of the Freedom of Information Law. It is emphasized that the Court rejected "SUNY's contention that disclosure turns on whether the requested information is in the physical possession of the agency", for such a view "ignores the plain language of the FOIL definition of 'records' as information kept or held 'by, with or for an agency'" [see Encore College Bookstores, Inc. v. Auxiliary Services Corporation of the State University of New York at Farmingdale, 87 NY 2d 410. 417 (1995)].

Also pertinent is the first decision in which the Court of Appeals dealt squarely with the scope of the term "record", in which the matter involved documents pertaining to a lottery sponsored by a fire department. Although the agency contended that the documents did not pertain to the performance of its official duties, i.e., fighting fires, but rather to a "nongovernmental" activity, the Court rejected the claim of a "governmental versus nongovernmental dichotomy" and found that the documents constituted "records" subject to rights of access granted by the Law. Moreover, the Court determined that:

"The statutory definition of 'record' makes nothing turn on the purpose for which it relates. This conclusion accords with the spirit as well as the letter of the statute. For not only are the expanding boundaries of governmental activity increasingly difficult to draw, but in perception, if not in actuality, there is bound to be considerable crossover between governmental and nongovernmental activities, especially where both are carried on by the same person or persons" [Westchester-Rockland Newspapers v. Kimball, 50 NY2d 575, 581 (1980)].

The point made in the final sentence of the passage quoted above may be especially relevant, for there may be "considerable crossover" in the activities of Town officials. In my view, when those persons communicate with one another in writing in their capacities as Town officials or with others, such as a developer, any such communications constitute agency records that fall within the framework of the Freedom of Information Law, even though they may be kept at locations other than Town offices.

Second, the definition of the term "record" also makes clear that email communications made or received by government officers and employees fall within the scope of the Freedom of Information Law. Based on its specific language, if information is maintained by or for an agency in some physical form, it constitutes a "record" subject to rights of access conferred by the Freedom of Information Law. The definition includes specific reference to computer tapes and discs, and it was held soon after the reenactment of the statute that "[i]nformation is increasingly being stored in computers and access to such data should not be restricted merely because it is not in printed form" [Babigian v. Evans, 427 NYS2d 688, 691 (1980); aff’d 97 AD2d 992 (1983); see also, Szikszay v. Buelow, 436 NYS2d 558 (1981)]. Whether information is stored on paper, on a computer tape, or in a computer, it constitutes a "record." In short, email is merely a means of transmitting information; it can be viewed on a screen and printed, and I believe that the email communications at issue must be treated in the same manner as traditional paper records for the purpose of their consideration under the Freedom of Information Law.

Third, insofar as records exist, as a general matter, the Freedom of Information Law is based upon a presumption of access. Stated differently, all records of an agency are available, except to the extent that records or portions thereof fall within one or more grounds for denial appearing in §87(2)(a) through (i) of the Law.

From my perspective, communications between Town officials and a developer, for example, whether they were made by means of email or more traditional methods, would be accessible, for none of the grounds for denial could properly be asserted. Further, for reasons discussed earlier, those communications would be subject to rights granted by the Freedom of Information Law even if they are stored in a Town official’s home computer.

With respect to documentation relating to the public opinion survey, if, as you suggest, "tallies and compilation" exist, I believe that they would be accessible. Relevant would be §87(2)(g)(i), which requires that statistical or factual information contained within internal government records must be disclosed.

Lastly, when an agency indicates that it does not maintain or cannot locate a record, an applicant for the record may seek a certification to that effect. Section 89(3) of the Freedom of Information Law provides in part that, in such a situation, on request, an agency "shall certify that it does not have possession of such record or that such record cannot be found after diligent search."
I hope that I have been of assistance.



Robert J. Freeman
Executive Director


cc: Town Board