FOIL-AO-16290

November 2, 2006

 

Ms. Marnie Eisenstadt
Reporter
The Post-Standard
Clinton Square
P.O. Box 4915
Syracuse, NY 13221

The staff of the Committee on Open Government is authorized to issue advisory opinions. The ensuing staff advisory opinion is based solely upon the facts presented in your correspondence.

Dear Ms. Eisenstadt:

We are in receipt of your request for an advisory opinion concerning application of the Freedom of Information Law to requests made to the Onondaga County Department of Law for copies of “visitor logs reflecting visitors to Timothy Ginochetti from August 24 to September 14, 2006.” Based on information you provided, that “the logbook is kept on the reception desk and visitors informed you that they have looked through the logbook,” the County granted your request, “insofar as the Sheriff’s office is able to identify Mr. Ginochetti’s visitors in the logbook for the period [described] ... and that all other inmates and their visitor names are redacted.”

The County based its response on an advisory opinion from the Committee on Open Government indicating that if a visitor's log or similar documentation is kept in plain sight and can be viewed by any person, and if the staff at the facility have the ability to locate portions of the log of your interest, we believe that those portions of the log would be available. If such records are not kept in plain sight and cannot ordinarily be viewed, it is our opinion that those portions of the log pertaining to persons other than oneself could be withheld on the ground that disclosure would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

In addition, the County indicated that “prior to disclosure, the Sheriff’s Office will provide Mr. Ginochetti and his attorney with a copy of your original FOIL request, the Sheriff’s Office response, your appeal, this appeal decision and a copy of the proposed redacted, logbook page(s) to be disclosed. Mr Ginochetti will be given an opportunity to object to the disclosure.” In this regard, we offer the following comments.

First, in conjunction with the definitions of "agency" and "record" appearing respectively in subdivisions (3) and (4) of §86 of the Freedom of Information Law, any documentation maintained by the County would constitute an agency record subject to rights of access, and it is our view that the County is required to disclose its records to the extent required by the Freedom of Information Law. Certainly representatives of the County may consult or confer with other persons or entities in order to seek advice or guidance prior to granting or denying access to records. Nevertheless, we believe that it is the County's responsibility to grant or deny access to its records and that it would be inappropriate to condition disclosure on the consent of the subject of the record in this instance.

We emphasize that whether a person prefers to authorize or preclude disclosure is irrelevant here. In a case in which a law enforcement agency permitted persons reporting incidents to indicate on a form their preference concerning the agency's disclosure of the incident to the news media, the Appellate Division found that, as a matter of law, the agency could not withhold the record based upon the "preference" of the person who reported the offense. Specifically, in Johnson Newspaper Corporation v. Call, Genesee County Sheriff, 115 AD 2d 335 (1985), it was found that:

"There is no question that the 'releasable copies' of reports of offenses prepared and maintained by the Genesee County Sheriff's office on the forms currently in use are governmental records under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Law (Public Officers Law art 6) subject, however, to the provisions establishing exemptions (see, Public Officers Law section 87[2]). We reject the contrary contention of respondents and declare that disclosure of a 'releasable copy' of an offense report may not be denied, as a matter of law, pursuant to Public Officers Law section 87(2)(b) as constituting an 'unwarranted invasion of personal privacy' solely because the person reporting the offense initials a box on the form indicating his preference that 'the incident not be released to the media, except for police investigative purposes or following arrest'."

Moreover, although the issue did not involve law enforcement, the Court of Appeals has held that a request for or a promise of confidentiality is all but meaningless; unless one or more of the grounds for denial appearing in the Freedom of Information Law may appropriately be asserted, the record sought must be made available [see Washington Post v. New York State Insurance Department, 61 NY 2d 557, 567 (1984)]. This is not to suggest that records or portions of records might not justifiably be withheld, but rather that a claim or promise of confidentiality in our opinion is irrelevant to an analysis of rights of access to records.

Second, the Freedom of Information Law provides direction concerning the time and manner in which agencies must respond to requests. Specifically, §89(3) of the Freedom of Information Law states in part that:

"Each entity subject to the provisions of this article, within five business days of the receipt of a written request for a record reasonably described, shall make such record available to the person requesting it, deny such request in writing or furnish a written acknowledgement of the receipt of such request and a statement of the approximate date, which shall be reasonable under the circumstances of the request, when such request will be granted or denied...”

It is noted that new language was added to that provision on May 3, 2005 (Chapter 22, Laws of 2005) stating that:

“If circumstances prevent disclosure to the person requesting the record or records within twenty business days from the date of the acknowledgement of the receipt of the request, the agency shall state, in writing, both the reason for the inability to grant the request within twenty business days and a date certain within a reasonable period, depending on the circumstances, when the request will be granted in whole or in part.”

Based on the foregoing, an agency must grant access to records, deny access in writing, or acknowledge the receipt of a request within five business days of receipt of a request. When an acknowledgement is given, it must include an approximate date within twenty business days indicating when it can be anticipated that a request will be granted or denied. If it is known that circumstances prevent the agency from granting access within twenty business days, or if the agency cannot grant access by the approximate date given and needs more than twenty business days to grant access, however, it must provide a written explanation of its inability to do so and a specific date by which it will grant access. That date must be reasonable in consideration of the circumstances of the request.

The amendments clearly are intended to prohibit agencies from unnecessarily delaying disclosure. They are not intended to permit agencies to wait until the fifth business day following the receipt of a request and then twenty additional business days to determine rights of access, unless it is reasonable to do so based upon “the circumstances of the request.” It is our perspective that every law must be implemented in a manner that gives reasonable effect to its intent, and we point out that in its statement of legislative intent, §84 of the Freedom of Information Law states that "it is incumbent upon the state and its localities to extend public accountability wherever and whenever feasible." Therefore, when records are clearly available to the public under the Freedom of Information Law, or if they are readily retrievable, there may be no basis for a delay in disclosure. As the Court of Appeals, the state’s highest court, has asserted:

"...the successful implementation of the policies motivating the enactment of the Freedom of Information Law centers on goals as broad as the achievement of a more informed electorate and a more responsible and responsive officialdom. By their very nature such objectives cannot hope to be attained unless the measures taken to bring them about permeate the body politic to a point where they become the rule rather than the exception. The phrase 'public accountability wherever and whenever feasible' therefore merely punctuates with explicitness what in any event is implicit" [Westchester News v. Kimball, 50 NY2d 575, 579 (1980)].

In a judicial decision concerning the reasonableness of a delay in disclosure that cited and confirmed the advice rendered by this office concerning reasonable grounds for delaying disclosure, it was held that:

“The determination of whether a period is reasonable must be made on a case by case basis taking into account the volume of documents requested, the time involved in locating the material, and the complexity of the issues involved in determining whether the materials fall within one of the exceptions to disclosure. Such a standard is consistent with some of the language in the opinions, submitted by petitioners in this case, of the Committee on Open Government, the agency charged with issuing advisory opinions on FOIL”(Linz v. The Police Department of the City of New York, Supreme Court, New York County, NYLJ, December 17, 2001).

If neither a response to a request nor an acknowledgement of the receipt of a request is given within five business days, if an agency delays responding for an unreasonable time beyond the approximate date of less than twenty business days given in its acknowledgement, if it acknowledges that a request has been received, but has failed to grant access by the specific date given beyond twenty business days, or if the specific date given is unreasonable, a request may be considered to have been constructively denied [see §89(4)(a)]. In such a circumstance, the denial may be appealed in accordance with §89(4)(a), which states in relevant part that:

"...any person denied access to a record may within thirty days appeal in writing such denial to the head, chief executive, or governing body, who shall within ten business days of the receipt of such appeal fully explain in writing to the person requesting the record the reasons for further denial, or provide access to the record sought."

Section 89(4)(b) was also amended, and it states that a failure to determine an appeal within ten business days of the receipt of an appeal constitutes a denial of the appeal. In that circumstance, the appellant has exhausted his or her administrative remedies and may initiate a challenge to a constructive denial of access under Article 78 of the Civil Practice Rules.

Further, on August 16, 2006, Governor Pataki signed into law, effective immediately, legislation that broadens the authority of the courts to award attorney’s fees when government agencies fail to comply with the Freedom of Information Law (S. 7011-A, Chapter 492). Under the amendments, when a person initiates a judicial proceeding under the Freedom of Information Law and substantially prevails, a court has the discretionary authority to award costs and reasonable attorney’s fees when the agency had no reasonable basis for denying access to records, or when the agency failed to comply with the time limits for responding to a request.

On behalf of the Committee on Open Government we hope this is helpful to you.

Sincerely,

Camille S. Jobin-Davis
Assistant Director

CSJ:tt

cc: Christine M. Pezzulo