FOIL AO 19699                                                        December 11, 2018



FROM:            Robert J. Freeman, Executive Director

CC:                  Timothy Lynch (
Angela Gmuca (

The staff of the Committee on Open Government is authorized to issue advisory opinions.  The ensuing staff advisory opinion is based solely upon the information presented in your correspondence, except as otherwise indicated.

I have received your letter in which you sought an opinion concerning your right under the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) to gain access to records or portions of records indicating “the names of the members of the search committees at Queensborough Community College for two positions for which [you] have applied.”

In response to the request, you were informed that the members of those committees “are not permitted to communicate with anyone concerning the search, including candidates (or their representatives) outside of the interview process”, and that “to maintain the integrity of the search process, the College does not reveal the names of the members of the search committee to candidates until they have been invited in for an interview.”  While I understand the need to “maintain the integrity of the process”, I believe that the College must disclose the names in question to comply with FOIL.  In this regard, I offer the following comments.

As a general matter, FOIL is based upon a presumption of access. Stated differently, all records of an agency are available, except to the extent that records or portions thereof fall within one or more grounds for denial appearing in §87(2) of the Law. From my perspective, two of the grounds for denial are pertinent to an analysis of rights of access.

I am unaware of the status of the members of the search committees or whether they are government employees or consultants retained by the College.  In either case, records prepared by or communications involving those persons and College officials would constitute "intra-agency" materials that fall within the scope of §87(2)(g). That provision permits an agency to withhold records that:

"are inter-agency or intra-agency materials which are not:

i.   statistical or factual tabulations or data;
ii.  instructions to staff that affect the public;
iii. final agency policy or determinations; or
iv. external audits, including but not limited to audits performed by the comptroller and the federal government..."

It is noted that the language quoted above contains what in effect is a double negative. While inter-agency or intra-agency materials may be withheld, portions of such materials consisting of statistical or factual information, instructions to staff that affect the public, final agency policy or determinations or external audits must be made available, unless a different ground for denial could appropriately be asserted. Concurrently, those portions of inter-agency or intra-agency materials that are reflective of opinion, advice, recommendation and the like could in my view be withheld.

In a discussion of the issue of consultant records, the Court of Appeals, the State's highest court, stated that:

"In connection with their deliberative process, agencies may at times require opinions and recommendations from outside consultants. It would make little sense to protect the deliberative process when such reports are prepared by agency employees yet deny this protection when reports are prepared for the same purpose by outside consultants retained by agencies. Accordingly, we hold that records may be considered 'intra-agency material' even though prepared by an outside consultant at the behest of an agency as part of the agency's deliberative process (see, Matter of Sea Crest Constr. Corp. v. Stubing, 82 AD 2d 546, 549, supra; Matter of 124 Ferry St. Realty Corp. v. Hennessy, 82 AD 2d 981, 983)" [Xerox Corporation v. Town of Webster, 65 NY 2d 131, 132-133 (1985)].

Based upon the foregoing, the Court in Xerox determined that the contents of intra-agency materials determine the extent to which they may be available but specified that:
"While the reports in principle may be exempt from disclosure…to the extent the reports contain 'statistical or factual tabulations or data' (Public Officers Law section 87[2][g][i], or other material subject to production, they should be redacted and made available to the appellant" (id. at 133).

The names of those serving on search committees clearly constitute factual information.  That being so, §87(2)(g) would not serve as a basis for denial of access.

The other exception of significance, §87(2)(b), authorizes an agency to withhold records insofar as disclosure would constitute "an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy". Because the committee members serve either in their capacities as agency employees or in their business or professional capacities as consultants, I believe that their names are accessible under FOIL. There are several judicial decisions, both New York State and federal, which in my opinion are relevant, in that they pertain to records about individuals in their business or professional capacities.

For instance, one decision involved a request for the names and addresses of mink and ranch fox farmers from a state agency (ASPCA v. NYS Department of Agriculture and Markets, Supreme Court, Albany County, May 10, 1989). In granting access, the court relied in part and quoted from an opinion rendered by this office in which it was advised that "the provisions concerning privacy in the Freedom of Information Law are intended to be asserted only with respect to 'personal' information relating to natural persons". Further, the court held that:

"...the names and business addresses of individuals or entities engaged in animal farming for profit do not constitute information of a private nature, and this conclusion is not changed by the fact that a person's business address may also be the address of his or her residence. In interpreting the Federal Freedom of Information Law Act (5 USC 552), the Federal Courts have already drawn a distinction between information of a 'private' nature which may not be disclosed, and information of a 'business' nature which may be disclosed (see e.g., Cohen v. Environmental Protection Agency, 575 F Supp. 425 (D.C.D.C. 1983)."

In another decision, Newsday, Inc. v. New York State Department of Health (Supreme Court, Albany County, October 15, 1991)], data acquired by the State Department of Health concerning the performance of open heart surgery by hospitals and individual surgeons was requested. Although the Department provided statistics relating to surgeons, it withheld their identities. In response to a request for an advisory opinion, it was advised by this office, based upon the New York FOIL and judicial interpretations of the federal Freedom of Information Act, that the names should be disclosed, for the data related to professional licensees acting in the performance of professional activities. The court agreed and cited the opinion rendered by this office.

Like FOIL, the federal Act includes an exception to rights of access designed to protect personal privacy. Specifically, 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6) states that rights conferred by the Act do not apply to "personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." In construing that provision, federal courts have held that the exception:

"was intended by Congress to protect individuals from public disclosure of 'intimate details of their lives, whether the disclosure be of personnel files, medical files or other similar files'. Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. Commodity Futures Trading Com'n supra, 627 F.2d at 399, quoting Rural Housing Alliance v. U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, 498 F.2d 73, 77 (D.C. Cir. 1974); see Robles v. EOA, 484 F.2d 843, 845 (4th Cir. 1973). Although the opinion in Rural Housing stated that the exemption 'is phrased broadly to protect individuals from a wide range of embarrassing disclosures', 498 F.2d at 77, the context makes clear the court's recognition that the disclosures with which the statute is concerned are those involving matters of an intimate personal nature. Because of its intimate personal nature, information regarding 'marital status, legitimacy of children, identity of fathers of children, medical condition, welfare payment, alcoholic consumption, family fights, reputation, and so on' falls within the ambit of Exemption 4. Id. By contrast, as Judge Robinson stated in the Chicago Board of Trade case, 627 F.2d at 399, the decisions of this court have established that information connected with professional relationships does not qualify for the exemption" [Sims v. Central Intelligence Agency, 642 F.2d 562, 573-573 (1980)].

In Cohen, the decision cited in ASPCA v. Department of Agriculture and Markets, supra, it was stated pointedly that: "The privacy exemption does not apply to information regarding professional or business activities...This information must be disclosed even if a professional reputation may be tarnished" (supra, 429).

            In sum, based on the foregoing, insofar as the identities of the members of the search committees are found in College records, they consist of factual information.  Perhaps more significantly, the exception concerning unwarranted invasions of personal privacy would not apply, for the information sought would identify persons acting in a governmental, official or professional capacity.

I hope that I have been of assistance. If you would like to discuss the matter, please feel free to contact me.