January 6, 1993


Mr. Peter W. Sluys
Managing Editor
Community Media Inc.
25 W. Central Avenue
Box 93
Pearl River, NY 10965

The staff of the Committee on Open Government is authorized to issue advisory opinions. The ensuing staff advisory opinion is based solely upon the facts presented in your correspondence.

Dear Mr. Sluys:

I have received your letter of December 24 in which you sought an advisory opinion concerning rights of access to "all bills - itemized as required by law" forwarded to the Clarkstown Central School District by its law firm.

The District's interim records access officer, Lucy H. Schluter, indicated that, in addition to a voucher providing general descriptions of legal services rendered and the amounts billed for each, the firm also submits a "Confidential Monthly Summary" (CMS) of approximately thirty-five pages that falls within the coverage of the attorney-client privilege and cannot be disclosed. She indicated that the CMS includes descriptions of "strategy and status regarding litigation, collective bargaining and personnel matters", names of students and employees facing disciplinary charges, and "investigatory matters which might lead to court action." She suggested that "[t]o reveal the specifics of the legal steps and activities taken on behalf of the District, either offensive or defensive in nature, would, in [her] opinion, be detrimental to the District's ability to defend itself." Ms. Schluter also wrote that, based upon your questions, you wish to ascertain the numbers of hours of legal work each month, the level and number of attorneys doing the work, and the overall cost of same," and she suggested that it "may be possible to pull that information off the CMS and to create a separate document with such information".

In this regard, I offer the following comments.

First, as a general matter, the Freedom of Information Law is based upon a presumption of access. Stated differently, all records of an agency are available, except to the extent that records or portions thereof fall within one or more grounds for denial appearing in section 87(2)(a) through (i) of the Law.

Second, in my opinion, bills, vouchers, contracts, receipts and similar records reflective of payments made or expenses incurred by an agency or payments made to an agency's staff or agents are generally available, for none of the grounds for denial would be applicable in most instances. With specific respect to payments to attorneys, I point out that, while the communications between an attorney and client are often privileged, it has been established in case law that records of the monies paid and received by an attorney or a law firm for services rendered to a client are not privileged [see e.g., People v. Cook, 372 NYS 2d 10 (1975)]. If, however, portions of time sheets, bills or related records contain information that is confidential under the attorney-client privilege, those portions could in my view be withheld under section 87(2)(a) of the Freedom of Information Law, which permits an agency to withhold records or portions thereof that are "specifically exempted from disclosure by state or federal statute" (see Civil Practice Law and Rules, section 4503). Therefore, while some identifying details or descriptions of services rendered found in the records in question might justifiably be withheld, numbers indicating the amounts expended and other details to be discussed further are in my view accessible under the Freedom of Information Law.

Based upon Ms. Schluter's description of the contents of a CMS, there may be other grounds for denial that would apply. for instance, insofar as the records identify or could identify particular students, I believe that they must be withheld. Another statute that exempts records from disclosure is the Family Education Rights and Privacy Act (20 U.S.C. section 1232g), which is commonly known as the "Buckley Amendment". In brief, the Buckley Amendment applies to all educational agencies or institutions that participate in grant programs administered by the United States Department of Education. As such, the Buckley Amendment includes within its scope virtually all public educational institutions and many private educational institutions. The focal point of the Act is the protection of privacy of students. It provides, in general, that any "education record," a term that is broadly defined, that is personally identifiable to a particular student or students is confidential, unless the parents of students under the age of eighteen waive their right to confidentiality, or unless a student eighteen years or over similarly waives his or her right to confidentiality. Further, the federal regulations promulgated under the Buckley Amendment define the phrase "personally identifiable information" to include:

"(a) The student's name; (b) The name of the student's parents or other family member; (c) The address of the student or student's family; (d) A personal identifier, such as the student's social security number or student number; (e) A list of personal characteristics that would make the student's identity easily traceable; or (f) Other information that would make the student's identity easily traceable" (34 CFR Section 99.3).

Based upon the foregoing, references to students' names or other aspects of records that would make a student's identity easily traceable must in my view be withheld in order to comply with federal law. Similarly, references to employees involved in disciplinary proceedings when such proceedings have not resulted in any final determination reflective of misconduct could be withheld on the ground that disclosure would constitute "an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" [see Herald Company v. School District of the City of Syracuse, 430 NY 2d 460 (1980)]. In addition, §87(2)(c) enables agencies to withhold records to the extent that disclosure would "impair present or imminent contract awards or collective bargaining negotiations." That provision may also be pertinent in determining access. In short, there may be a variety of situations in which details found within a CMS may justifiably be withheld.

Further, it would appear that Ms. Schluter's suggestion at the end of her response would be generally consistent with the holding in the most recent decision on the matter. Again, she suggested that information be extracted from a CMS in an effort to ensure that the public can know the amount of time billed by attorneys and the charges incurred by the District. The decision, Knapp v. Board of Education, Canisteo Central School District (Supreme Court, Steuben County, November 23, 1990), involved an applicant ("petitioner") who sought billing statements for legal services provided to the Board ("respondents") by a law firm. Since the statements made available included "only the time period covered and the total amount owed for services and disbursements", petitioner contended that "she is entitled to that billing information which would detail the fee, the type of matter for which the legal services were rendered and the names of the parties to any current litigation". In its discussion of the issue, the court found that: "The difficulty of defining the limits of the attorney client privilege has been recognized by the New York State Court of Appeals. (Matter of Priest v. Hennessy, 51 NY2d 62, 68.) Nevertheless, the Court has ruled that this privilege is not limitless and generally does not extend to the fee arrangements between an attorney and client. (Matter of Priest v. Hennessy, supra.) As a communication regarding a fee has no direct relevance to the legal advice actually given, the fee arrangement is not privileged. (Matter of Priest v. Hennessy, supra. at 69.)

"There appear to be no New York cases which specifically address how much of a fee arrangement must be revealed beyond the name of the client, the amount billed and the terms of the agreement. However, the United States Court of Appeals, in interpreting federal law, has found that questions pertaining to the date and general nature of legal services performed were not violative of client confidentiality. (Cotton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633.) In that Court's analysis such information did not involve the substance of the matters was not privileged...

"...Respondents have not justified their refusal to obliterate any and all information which would reveal the date, general nature of service rendered and time spent. While the Court can understand that in a few limited instances the substance of a legal communication might be revealed in a billing statement, Respondents have failed to come forward with proof that such information is contained in each and every document so as to justify a blanket denial of disclosure. Conclusory characterizations are insufficient to support a claim of privilege. (Church of Scientology v. State of New York, 46 NY 2d 906, 908.)...Therefore, Petitioner's request for disclosure of the fee, type of matter and names of parties to pending litigation on each billing statement must be granted."

In my view, disclosure of information analogous to that described in Knapp would be appropriate. It is reiterated, however, that any such disclosure need not include, for example, information identifiable to students or to employees against whom disciplinary charges are pending, or which if disclosed would impair the contracting or collective bargaining process.

I hope that I have been of some assistance.



Robert J. Freeman
Executive Director


cc: Dr. John Krause
Warren Berbit