October 14, 1993
Ms. Monica Getz, President
          Dobbs Ferry League of Women Voters
          Shadowbrook
          Broadway
          Irvington, NY 10533
The staff of the Committee on Open Government is authorized to
          issue advisory opinions. The ensuing staff advisory opinion is
          based solely upon the facts presented in your correspondence.
Dear Ms. Getz:
 As you may be aware, Susan King has asked that I review and
          offer an opinion with respect to certain provisions of code of
          ethics proposed by the Village of Dobbs Ferry.
 The focus of the inquiry involves the proposal as it may
          relate to the Freedom of Information Law and the Open Meetings Law. 
          Specifically, the proposed code would state in relevant part that:
 "The Village Ethics Board shall, with respect
  to every complaint that it receives and all
  related deliberations, findings, opinions,
  recommendations and dispositions thereof:
 a. hold all such matters in
  confidence and not publicly reveal
  them, to the fullest extent
  allowable by applicable law,
  including the New York State Freedom
  of Information Law, as it may be
  amended.
 b. meet only in executive session,
  closed to the public, to the fullest
  extent allowed by the New York State
  Open Meetings Law, as it may be
  amended, and
 c. render a written confidential
  report of its findings, opinions and
  recommendations which report will be
  provided to the subject of the
  investigation."
 In my opinion, the language quoted above is unnecessary and
          potentially in conflict with both the Freedom of Information Law
          and the Open Meetings Law. In this regard, I offer the following
          comments.
 First, the Freedom of Information Law pertains to all agency
          records, and §86(4) of that statute defines the term "record"
          expansively to include:
 "any information kept, held, filed, produced,
  reproduced by, with or for an agency or the
  state legislature, in any physical form
  whatsoever including, but not limited to,
  reports, statements, examinations, memoranda,
  opinions, folders, files, books, manuals,
  pamphlets, forms, papers, designs, drawings,
  maps, photos, letters, microfilms, computer
  tapes or discs, rules, regulations or codes."
Due to the breadth of the language quoted above, any documentation,
          irrespective of its function or origin, maintained by an agency
          would constitute a "record" subject to rights of access.
 Second, as a general matter, the Freedom of Information Law is
          based upon a presumption of access. Stated differently, all
          records of an agency are available, except to the extent that
          records or portions thereof fall within one or more grounds for
          denial appearing in §87(2)(a) through (i) of the Law.
 In my view, an assertion or claim of confidentiality, unless
          it is based upon a statute, is likely meaningless. When
          confidentiality is conferred by a statute, records fall outside the
          scope of rights of access pursuant to §87(2)(a) of the Freedom
          of
          Information Law, which states that an agency may withhold records
          that "are specifically exempted from disclosure by state or federal
          statute". If there is no statute upon which an agency can rely
          to
          characterize records as "confidential" or "exempted
          from
          disclosure", the records are subject to whatever rights of access
          exist under the Freedom of Information Law [see Doolan v.BOCES, 48
          NY 2d 341 (1979); Washington Post v. Insurance Department, 61 NY 2d
          557 (1984); Gannett News Service, Inc. v. State Office of
          Alcoholism and Substance Abuse, 415 NYS 2d 780 (1979)]. As such,
          an assertion of confidentiality without more, would not in my
          opinion guarantee or require confidentiality.
 Moreover, it has been held by several courts, including the
          Court of Appeals, that an agency's regulations or the provisions of
          a local enactment, such as an administrative code, local law,
          charter or ordinance, for example, do not constitute a "statute"
          [see e.g., Morris v. Martin, Chairman of the State Board of
          Equalization and Assessment, 440 NYS 2d 365, 82 Ad 2d 965, reversed
          55 NY 2d 1026 (1982); Zuckerman v. NYS Board of Parole, 385 NYS 2d
          811, 53 AD 2d 405 (1976); Sheehan v. City of Syracuse, 521 NYS 2d
          207 (1987)]. For purposes of the Freedom of Information Law, a
          statute would be an enactment of the State Legislature or Congress. 
          Therefore, a local enactment cannot confer, require or promise
          confidentiality. This not to suggest that many of the records
          used, developed or acquired in conjunction with an ethics code must
          be disclosed; rather, I am suggesting that those records may in
          some instances be withheld in accordance with the grounds for
          denial appearing in the Freedom of Information Law, and that any
          local enactment that is inconsistent with that statute would be
          void to the extent of any such inconsistency.
 It is likely in my view that two the grounds for denial would
          be particularly relevant with respect to records maintained by a
          board of ethics.
 Section 87(2)(b) of the Freedom of Information Law authorizes
          an agency to withhold records when disclosure would result in an
          unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. Although the standard
          concerning privacy is flexible and may be subject to conflicting
          interpretations, the courts have provided substantial direction
          regarding the privacy of public employees. It is clear that public
          employees enjoy a lesser degree of privacy than others, for it has
          been found in various contexts that public employees are required
          to be more accountable than others. With regard to records
          pertaining to public employees, the courts have found that, as a
          general rule, records that are relevant to the performance of a
          public employee's official duties are available, for disclosure in
          such instances would result in a permissible rather than an
          unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [see e.g., Farrell v.
          Village Board of Trustees, 372 NYS 2d 905 (1975); Gannett Co. v.
          County of Monroe, 59 AD 2d 309 (1977), aff'd 45 NY 2d 954 (1978);
          Sinicropi v. County of Nassau, 76 AD 2d 838 (1980); Geneva Printing
          Co. and Donald C. Hadley v. Village of Lyons, Sup. Ct., Wayne Cty.,
          March 25, 1981; Montes v. State, 406 NYS 2d 664 (Court of Claims,
          1978); Powhida v. City of Albany, 147 AD 2d 236 (1989); Scaccia v.
          NYS Division of State Police, 530 NYS 2d 309, 138 AD 2d 50 (1988);
          Steinmetz v. Board of Education, East Moriches, Sup. Ct., Suffolk
          Cty., NYLJ, Oct. 30, 1980); Capital Newspapers v. Burns, 67 NY 2d
          562 (1986)]. Conversely, to the extent that records are irrelevant
          to the performance of one's official duties, it has been found that
          disclosure would indeed constitute an unwarranted invasion of
          personal privacy [see e.g., Matter of Wool, Sup. Ct., Nassau Cty.,
          NYLJ, Nov. 22, 1977]. 
 Several of the decisions cited above, for example, Farrell, 
          Sinicropi, Geneva Printing, Scaccia and Powhida, dealt with
          situations in which determinations indicating the imposition of
          some sort of disciplinary action pertaining to particular public
          employees were found to be available. However, when allegations or
          charges of misconduct have not yet been determined or did not
          result in disciplinary action, the records relating to such
          allegations may, in my view, be withheld, for disclosure would
          result in an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [see e.g.,
          Herald Company v. School District of City of Syracuse, 430 NYS 2d
          460 (1980)]. Further, to the extent that charges are dismissed or
          allegations are found to be without merit, I believe that they may
          be withheld.
 There may also be privacy considerations concerning persons
          other than employees who may be subjects of a board's inquiries. 
          For instance, I believe that the name of a complainant or witness
          could be withheld in appropriate circumstances as an unwarranted
          invasion of personal privacy. 
 The other provision of relevance, §87(2)(g), states that an
          agency may withhold records that:
 "are inter-agency or intra-agency materials
  which are not:
 i. statistical or factual tabulations or
  data;
 ii. instructions to staff that affect the
  public;
 iii. final agency policy or determinations;
  or
 iv. external audits, including but not
  limited to audits performed by the comptroller
  and the federal government..."
It is noted that the language quoted above contains what in effect
          is a double negative. While inter-agency or intra-agency materials
          may be withheld, portions of such materials consisting of
          statistical or factual information, instructions to staff that
          affect the public, final agency policy or determinations or
          external audits must be made available, unless a different ground
          for denial could appropriately be asserted. Concurrently, 
          those portions of inter-agency or intra-agency materials that are
          reflective of opinion, advice, recommendation and the like could in
          my view be withheld. Records prepared in conjunction with an
          inquiry or investigation would in my view constitute intra-agency
          materials. Insofar as they consist of opinions, advice,
          conjecture, recommendations and the like, I believe that they could
          be withheld. Factual information would in my view be available,
          except to the extent, under the circumstances, that disclosure
          would result in an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. 
          
  Lastly, as in the case of the Freedom of Information Law,
  insofar as a local enactment is more restrictive concerning access
  than the Open Meetings Law, I believe that it would be void. 
  Section 110 of the Open Meetings Law, entitled "Construction with
  other laws," states in subdivision (1) that:
 "Any provision of a charter, administrative
  code, local law, ordinance, or rule or
  regulation affecting a public body which is
  more restrictive with respect to public access
  than this article shall be deemed superseded
  hereby to the extent that such provision is
  more restrictive than this article."
Further, although the Open Meetings Law is based upon a presumption
          of openness and meetings of public bodies must generally by
          conducted open to the public, §105(1) of the Law specifies and
          limits the grounds for entry for entry into executive session.
 Relevant to the duties of a board of ethics is §105(1)(f) of
          the Law, which permits a public body to enter into an executive
          session to discuss:
 "the medical, financial, credit or employment
  history of a particular person or corporation,
  or matters leading to the appointment,
  employment, promotion, demotion, discipline,
  suspension, dismissal or removal of a
  particular person or corporation..."
If the issue before a board of ethics involves a particular person
          in conjunction with one or more of the subjects listed in
        §105(1)(f), I believe that an executive session could appropriately
          be held. For instance, if the issue deals with the "financial
          history" of a particular person or perhaps matters leading to
          the
          discipline of a particular person, §105(1)(f) could in my opinion
          be cited for the purpose of entering into an executive session.
 I also point out that a public body cannot "meet" in executive
          session. Section 102(3) of the Open Meetings Law defines the
          phrase "executive session" to mean a portion of an open meeting
          during which the public may be excluded. Moreover, a procedure
          must be accomplished during an open meeting before an executive
          session may be held. Specifically, §105(1) states in relevant
          part
          that:
 "Upon a majority vote of its total membership,
  taken in an open meeting pursuant to a motion
  identifying the general area or areas of the
  subject or subjects to be considered, a public
  body may conduct an executive session for the
  below enumerated purposes only..."
  
  In sum, because the Freedom of Information Law and the Open
  Meetings Law, which are state statutes, provide the parameters
  concerning the extent to which records and meetings must be open or
  may be closed, again, I believe that specific reference in a local
  enactment to the extent to which records should be withheld or
  meetings closed is unnecessary, and that any such reference could
  result in confusion, difficulties of interpretation and perhaps
  failure to comply with state statues.
I hope that I have been of some assistance.
Sincerely,
 Robert J. Freeman
  Executive Director
RJF:pb
          cc: Village Board of Trustees
  Susan King 
State of New York