June 20, 1995


Hon. Lauren C. Hatch
Village Clerk
Village of Voorheesville
P.O. Box 367
Voorheesville, NY 12186

The staff of the Committee on Open Government is authorized to issue advisory opinions. The ensuing staff advisory opinion is based solely upon the information presented in your correspondence.

Dear Ms. Hatch:

I have received your letter of June 7 in which you sought an advisory opinion concerning the Freedom of Information Law. The matter deals with a request for information on Village employees' health insurance, including "the type of coverage each individual carried and what dependents and spouses were on the coverage."

In this regard, I offer the following comments.

First, the Freedom of Information Law, in brief, is based upon a presumption of access. Stated differently, all records of an agency are available, except to the extent that records or portions thereof fall within one or more grounds for denial appearing in §87(2)(a) through (i) of the Law.

It is noted that there is nothing in the Freedom of Information Law that deals specifically with personnel records or personnel files. Further, the nature and content of so-called personnel files may differ from one agency to another, and from one employee to another. In any case, neither the characterization of documents as "personnel records" nor their placement in personnel files would necessarily render those documents "confidential" or deniable under the Freedom of Information Law (see Steinmetz v. Board of Education, East Moriches, Sup. Ct., Suffolk Cty., NYLJ, Oct. 30, 1980). On the contrary, the contents of those documents serve as the relevant factors in determining the extent to which they are available or deniable under the Freedom of Information Law.

The provision in the Freedom of Information Law of most significance concerning the information in question is, in my view, §87(2)(b). That provision permits an agency to withhold records to the extent that disclosure would constitute "an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy".

While the standard concerning privacy is flexible and may be subject to conflicting interpretations, the courts have provided substantial direction regarding the privacy of public officers employees. It is clear that public officers and employees enjoy a lesser degree of privacy than others, for it has been found in various contexts that public officers and employees are required to be more accountable than others. Further, with regard to records pertaining to public officers and employees, the courts have found that, as a general rule, records that are relevant to the performance of a their official duties are available, for disclosure in such instances would result in a permissible rather than an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [see e.g., Farrell v. Village Board of Trustees, 372 NYS 2d 905 (1975); Gannett Co. v. County of Monroe, 59 AD 2d 309 (1977), aff'd 45 NY 2d 954 (1978); Sinicropi v. County of Nassau, 76 AD 2d 838 (1980); Geneva Printing Co. and Donald C. Hadley v. Village of Lyons, Sup. Ct., Wayne Cty., March 25, 1981; Montes v. State, 406 NYS 2d 664 (Court of Claims, 1978); Powhida v. City of Albany, 147 AD 2d 236 (1989); Scaccia v. NYS Division of State Police, 530 NYS 2d 309, 138 AD 2d 50 (1988); Steinmetz v. Board of Education, East Moriches, supra; Capital Newspapers v. Burns, 109 AD 2d 292 (1985) aff'd 67 NY 2d 562 (1986)]. Conversely, to the extent that records are irrelevant to the performance of one's official duties, it has been found that disclosure would indeed constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [see e.g., Matter of Wool, Sup. Ct., Nassau Cty., NYLJ, Nov. 22, 1977].

It is noted that in Matter of Wool, the applicant requested a list of employees of a town "whose salaries were subject to deduction for union membership dues payable to Civil Service Employees Association...". In determining the issue, the Court held that:

"...the Legislature has established a scale to be used by a governmental body subject to the 'Freedom of Information Law' and to be utilized as well by the Court in reviewing the granting or denial of access to records of each governmental body. At one extreme lies records which are 'relevant or essential to the ordinary work of the agency or municipality' and in such event, regardless of their personal nature or contents, must be disclosed in toto. At the other extremity are those records which are not 'relevant or essential' - which contain personal matters wherein the right of the public to know must be delicately balanced against the right of the individual to privacy and confidentiality.

"The facts before this Court clearly are weighted in favor of individual rights. Membership or non-membership of a municipal employee in the CSEA is hardly necessary or essential to the ordinary work of a municipality. 'Public employees have the right to form, join and participate in, or to refrain from forming, joining or participating in any employee organization of their choosing.' Membership in the CSEA has no relevance to an employee's on-the-job performance or to the functioning of his or her employer."

Consequently, it was held that portions of records indicating membership in a union could be withheld as an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. Based on the Wool decision, it might be contended that whether a public employee is covered by a health insurance has no relevance to the performance of that person's official duties, and that, therefore, such information may be withheld.

From my perspective, such a conclusion would be overly restrictive. In Capital Newspapers v. Burns, supra, the issue involved records reflective of the days and dates of sick leave claimed by a particular police officer. The Appellate Division, as I interpret its decision, held that those records were clearly relevant to the performance of the officer's duties, for the Court found that:

"One of the most basic obligations of any employee is to appear for work when scheduled to do so. Concurrent with this is the rights of an employee to properly use sick leave available to him or her. In the instant case, intervenor had an obligation to report for work when scheduled along with a right to use sick leave in accordance with his collective bargaining agreement. The taxpayers have an interest in such use of sick leave for economic as well as safety reasons. Thus it can hardly be said that disclosure of the dates in February 1983 when intervenor made use of sick leave would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. Further, the motives of petitioners or the means by which they will report the information is not determinative since all records of government agencies are presumptively available for inspection without regard to the status, need, good faith or purpose of the applicant requesting access..." [109 AD 2d 92, 94-95 (1985)].

Perhaps more importantly, in a statement concerning the intent and utility of the Freedom of Information Law, the Court of Appeals affirmed and found that:

"The Freedom of Information Law expresses this State's strong commitment to open government and public accountability and imposes a broad standard of disclosure upon the State and its agencies (see, Matter of Farbman & Sons v New York City Health and Hosps. Corp., 62 NY 2d 75, 79). The statute, enacted in furtherance of the public's vested and inherent 'right to know', affords all citizens the means to obtain information concerning the day-to-day functioning of State and local government thus providing the electorate with sufficient information 'to make intelligent, informed choices with respect to both the direction and scope of governmental activities' and with an effective tool for exposing waste, negligence and abuse on the part of government officers" (Capital Newspapers v. Burns, supra, 565-566).

Based on the foregoing, it might appropriately be contended that the need to enable the public to make informed choices and provide a mechanism for exposing waste or abuse must be balanced against the possible infringement upon the privacy of a public officer or employee. The magnitude of an invasion of privacy is conjectural and must in many instances be determined subjectively. In this instance, if a court found the invasion of one's privacy to be substantial, it might be determined that the interest in protecting privacy outweighs the interest in identifying employees receiving coverage. It is possible, too, that a court could find that the identities of employees receiving coverage should be disclosed, but that the cost of coverage, by named employee, thereby indicating the nature of coverage (i.e., individual as opposed to family coverage) may be withheld, and that the cost of coverage should be disclosed generically. On the other hand, in conjunction with the direction provided by the Court of Appeals in the passage quoted earlier, it might be determined that the information sought should be disclosed in its entirety in view of the public's significant interest in knowing how public monies are being expended.

In consideration of the factors that have been discussed, it is my view that a disclosure indicating that a public officer or employee is covered by a health insurance plan at public expense would not represent or reveal an intimate detail of one's life. Arguably, the record reflective of the dates of sick leave claimed by a public employee found by the courts to be available represents a more intimate or personal invasion of privacy. However, if a disclosure of the cost of coverage for a particular employee indicates which plan that person has chosen or whether his or her plan involves individual or dependent coverage, such a disclosure may potentially result in the revelation of a number of details of a person's life and an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. For instance, an indication of cost might reveal whether the coverage involves medical treatment routinely provided by a clinic, as opposed to a primary care physician; it also may indicate the nature of coverage, i.e., whether coverage is basic or includes catastrophic care. Again, the cost may also reveal whether coverage is for an employee alone or for that person's family or dependents.

Most appropriate in my opinion would be a disclosure of costs of health care coverage by category in terms of plans that are offered or available to officers or employees. A separate disclosure should identify those officers or employees who receive coverage. However, in conjunction with the preceding commentary, I do not believe that the Village would be required to disclose the type of coverage an officer or employee has chosen or which specific dependents are covered under the plan.

I hope that I have been of some assistance. Should any further questions arise, please feel free to contact me.



Robert J. Freeman
Executive Director