March 6, 2002

The staff of the Committee on Open Government is authorized to issue advisory opinions. The ensuing staff advisory opinion is based solely upon the facts presented in your correspondence.


I have received your letter of January 31 in which you referred to a column written by the Chili Town Supervisor, Stephen W. Henderschott. You focused on a portion of the column in which the Supervisor wrote that "the Planning Board was scheduled to discuss [a] proposal informally." You have requested my opinion concerning "the word 'informally'."

In this regard, I am unaware of the Supervisor's intent as it relates to the use of that term. It is noted, however, that the word "formal" was considered in first critical judicial decision involving the scope of the Open Meetings Law.

Section 102(1) of the Open Meetings Law defines the term "meeting" to mean, the "formal convening" of a public body, such as a planning board, for the purpose of conducting public business.

In a landmark decision rendered in 1978, the Court of Appeals, the state's highest court, found that any gathering of a quorum of a public body for the purpose of conducting public business is a "meeting" that must be convened open to the public, whether or not there is an intent to take action and regardless of the manner in which a gathering may be characterized [see Orange County Publications v. Council of the City of Newburgh, 60 AD 2d 409, aff'd 45 NY 2d 947 (1978)].

The decision rendered by the Court of Appeals was precipitated by contentions made by public bodies that so-called "work sessions" and similar gatherings held for the purpose of discussion, but without an intent to take action, fell outside the scope of the Open Meetings Law. In discussing the issue, the Appellate Division, whose determination was unanimously affirmed by the Court of Appeals, stated that:

"We believe that the Legislature intended to include more than the mere formal act of voting or the formal execution of an official document. Every step of the decision-making process, including the decision itself, is a necessary preliminary to formal action. Formal acts have always been matters of public record and the public has always been made aware of how its officials have voted on an issue. There would be no need for this law if this was all the Legislature intended. Obviously, every thought, as well as every affirmative act of a public official as it relates to and is within the scope of one's official duties is a matter of public concern. It is the entire decision-making process that the Legislature intended to affect by the enactment of this statute" (60 AD 2d 409, 415).

The court also dealt with the characterization of meetings as "informal," stating that:

"The word 'formal' is defined merely as 'following or according with established form, custom, or rule' (Webster's Third New Int. Dictionary). We believe that it was inserted to safeguard the rights of members of a public body to engage in ordinary social transactions, but not to permit the use of this safeguard as a vehicle by which it precludes the application of the law to gatherings which have as their true purpose the discussion of the business of a public body" (id.). Based upon the direction given by the courts, if a majority of a public body gathers to discuss public business, any such gathering, in my opinion, would ordinarily constitute a "meeting" subject to the Open Meetings Law, irrespective of its characterization.

In consideration of the foregoing and Supervisor's commentary, I would conjecture that he was describing a meeting of the Planning Board during which a proposal would be discussed but no action would be taken.

I hope that I have been of assistance.


Robert J. Freeman
Executive Director


cc: Hon. Stephen W. Henderschott