April 30, 2002

The staff of the Committee on Open Government is authorized to issue advisory opinions. The ensuing staff advisory opinion is based solely upon the information presented in your correspondence.


I have received your note of April 12 and the materials attached to it. You indicated that you are "being 'threatened' for breaking 'confidentiality'" by disclosing information that you acquire during executive sessions in your role as a member of the City of Kingston School District Board of Education. Attached to your correspondence is a memorandum addressed to the Board and the acting superintendent by the District's attorney, Michael K. Lambert, in which he offered an opinion concerning a requirement that Board members "maintain the confidentiality of matters discussed in executive session" and the "consequences [that] may flow to an individual Board of Education member who wrongfully discloses confidential information."

In his opinion, Mr. Lambert cited §805-a(1)(b) of the General Municipal Law, which prohibits a municipal official from disclosing "confidential information acquired by him in the course of his official duties or use such information to further his personal interests." In consideration of that provision, he expressed the belief that "matters that are properly discussed in an executive session that are not otherwise public knowledge are 'confidential' within the meaning of" that statute. He also referred to an opinion that I prepared that offered a different opinion. The issue has arisen since the issuance of that opinion, and I believe that several judicial decisions, both state and federal, support my view. In this regard, I offer the following comments.

For purposes of considering the issue of "confidentiality", reference will be made to the Open Meetings Law, as well as the Freedom of Information Law. Both of those statutes are based on a presumption of openness. In brief, the former requires that meetings of public bodies, such as boards of education, be conducted open to the public, except when an executive session may properly be held under §105(1) or when a matter is exempt from its coverage; the latter requires that agency records be made available to the public, except to the extent that one or more grounds for denial access appearing in §87(2) may properly be asserted. The first ground for denial in the Freedom of Information Law, §87(2)(a), pertains to records that "are specifically exempted from disclosure by state or federal statute." Similarly, §108(3) of the Open Meetings Law refers to matters made confidential by state or federal law as "exempt" from the provisions of that statute.

Both the state's highest court, the Court of Appeals, and federal courts in construing access statutes have determined that the characterization of records as "confidential" or "exempted from disclosure by statute" must be based on statutory language that specifically confers or requires confidentiality. As stated by the Court of Appeals:

"Although we have never held that a State statute must expressly state it is intended to establish a FOIL exemption, we have required a showing of clear legislative intent to establish and preserve that confidentiality which one resisting disclosure claims as protection" [Capital Newspapers v. Burns, 67 NY2d 562, 567 (1986)].

In like manner, in construing the equivalent exception to rights of access in the federal Freedom of Information Act, it has been found that:

"Exemption 3 excludes from its coverage only matters that are:

specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld.

"5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1982) (emphasis added). Records sought to be withheld under authority of another statute thus escape the release requirements of FOIA if and only if that statute meets the requirements of Exemption 3, including the threshold requirement that it specifically exempt matters from disclosure. The Supreme Court has equated 'specifically' with 'explicitly.' Baldridge v. Shapiro, 455 U.S. 345, 355, 102 S. Ct. 1103, 1109, 71 L.Ed.2d 199 (1982). '[O]nly explicitly non-disclosure statutes that evidence a congressional determination that certain materials ought to be kept in confidence will be sufficient to qualify under the exemption.' Irons & Sears v. Dann, 606 F.2d 1215, 1220 (D.C.Cir.1979) (emphasis added). In other words, a statute that is claimed to qualify as an Exemption 3 withholding statute must, on its face, exempt matters from disclosure"[Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press v. U.S. Department of Justice, 816 F.2d 730, 735 (1987); modified on other grounds,831 F.2d 1184 (1987); reversed on other grounds, 489 U.S. 789 (1989); see also British Airports Authority v. C.A.B., D.C.D.C.1982, 531 F.Supp. 408; Inglesias v. Central Intelligence Agency, D.C.D.C.1981, 525 F.Supp, 547; Hunt v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, D.C.D.C.1979, 484 F.Supp. 47; Florida Medical Ass'n, Inc. v. Department of Health, Ed. & Welfare, D.C.Fla.1979, 479 F.Supp. 1291].

In short, to be "exempted from disclosure by statute", both state and federal courts have determined that a statute must leave no discretion to an agency: it must withhold such records.

In contrast, when records are not exempted from disclosure by a separate statute, both the Freedom of Information Law and its federal counterpart are permissive. Although an agency may withhold records in accordance with the grounds for denial appearing in §87(2), the Court of Appeals has held that the agency is not obliged to do so and may choose to disclose, stating that:

"...while an agency is permitted to restrict access to those records falling within the statutory exemptions, the language of the exemption provision contains permissible rather than mandatory language, and it is within the agency's discretion to disclose such records...if it so chooses" [Capital Newspapers v. Burns, 67 NY2d 562, 567 (1986)].

The only situations in which an agency cannot disclose would involve those instances in which a statute other than the Freedom of Information Law prohibits disclosure. The same is so under the federal Act. While a federal agency may withhold records in accordance with the grounds for denial, it has discretionary authority to disclose. Stated differently, there is nothing inherently confidential about records that an agency may choose to withhold or disclose; only when an agency has no discretion and must deny access would records be confidential or "specifically exempted from disclosure by statute" in accordance with §87(2)(a).

The same analysis is applicable in the context of the Open Meetings Law. While that statute authorizes public bodies to conduct executive sessions in circumstances described in paragraphs (a) through (h) of §105(1), there is no requirement that an executive session be held even though a public body has the right to do so. The introductory language of §105(1), which prescribes a procedure that must be accomplished before an executive session may be held, clearly indicates that a public body "may" conduct an executive session only after having completed that procedure. If, for example, a motion is made to conduct an executive session for a valid reason, and the motion is not carried, the public body could either discuss the issue in public or table the matter for discussion in the future.

Since a public body may choose to conduct an executive session or discuss an issue in public, information expressed during an executive session is not "confidential." To be confidential, again, a statute must prohibit disclosure and leave no discretion to an agency or official regarding the ability to disclose.

By means of example, if a discussion by a board of education concerns a record pertaining to a particular student (i.e., in the case of consideration of disciplinary action, an educational program, an award, etc.), the discussion would have to occur in private and the record would have to be withheld insofar as public discussion or disclosure would identify the student. As you may be aware, the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (20 USC §1232g) generally prohibits an educational agency from disclosing education records or information derived from those records that are identifiable to a student, unless the parents of the student consent to disclosure. In the context of the Open Meetings Law, a discussion concerning a student would constitute a matter made confidential by federal law and would be exempted from the coverage of that statute [see Open Meetings Law, §108(3)]. In the context of the Freedom of Information Law, an education record would be specifically exempted from disclosure by statute in accordance with §87(2)(a). In both contexts, I believe that a board of education, its members and school district employees would be prohibited from disclosing, because a statute requires confidentiality.

In a case in which the issue was whether discussions occurring during an executive session held by a school board could be considered "privileged", it was held that "there is no statutory provision that describes the matter dealt with at such a session as confidential or which in any way restricts the participants from disclosing what took place" (Runyon v. Board of Education, West Hempstead Union Free School District No. 27, Supreme Court, Nassau County, January 29, 1987). In the context of most of the duties of most municipal boards, councils or similar bodies, there is no statute that forbids disclosure or requires confidentiality. Again, the Freedom of Information Law states that an agency may withhold records in certain circumstances; it has discretion to grant or deny access. The only instances in which records may be characterized as "confidential" would, based on judicial interpretations, involve those situations in which a statute prohibits disclosure and leaves no discretion to a person or body.

In short, when a governmental entity may choose to disclose or withhold records or to discuss in issue in public or in private, I do not believe that the records or the discussion may be considered "confidential"; only when the government has no discretion and must withhold records or discuss a matter in private could the records or information be so considered.

Viewing the matter from a different vantage point, there are federal decisions indicating that general prohibitions against disclosure by government employees are unconstitutional. Although you are not an employee, but rather an elected member of the governing body of a public corporation, I believe that the thrust of case law is pertinent.

In Harman v. City of New York [140 F.3d 111 (2nd Cir. 1998)], the New York City Human Resources Administration (HRA) adopted an executive order that forbade its employees:

"...from speaking with the media regarding any policies or activities of the agency without first obtaining permission from the agency's media relations department. The City contends that these policies are necessary to meet the agencies' obligations under federal and state law to protect the confidentiality of reports and information relating to children, families and other individuals served by the agencies" (id., 115).

I note that §136 of the Social Services Law prohibits a social services agency from disclosing records identifiable to an applicant for or recipient of public assistance. Additionally, §372 of the Social Services Law prohibits the disclosure of records identifiable to "abandoned, delinquent, destitute, neglected or dependent children..." As such, there is no question that many of HRA's records are exempted from disclosure by statute and are, therefore, confidential. Nevertheless, the proceeding in Harman was precipitated by commentary that was not identifiable to any particular child or family; rather it involved the operation of the agency. As specified by the Court:

"...neither the Plaintiffs nor the public has any protected interest in releasing statutorily confidential information. Given the network of laws forbidding the dissemination of such information, Plaintiffs wisely concede this point. Therefore, we evaluate the interests of employees and of the public only in commenting on non- confidential agency policies and activities" (emphasis mine) (id., 119).

The Court in that passage highlighted the critical aspect of the point made earlier: that records may be characterized and exempted from disclosure by statute only when a statute forbids disclosure.

In finding that the order prohibiting speech that did not involve information that is exempted from disclosure by statute, the Court stated initially that:

"Individuals do not relinquish their First Amendment rights by accepting employment with the government. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S. Ct. 1731, 1734, 20 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1968). However, the Supreme Court has recognized that the government 'may impose restraints on the job-related speech of public employees that would be plainly unconstitutional if applied to the public at large.' United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 465, 115 S. Ct. 1003, 1012, 130 L. Ed2d 964 (1995) (NTEU). In evaluating the validity of a restraint on government employee speech, courts must 'arrive at a balance between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568, 88 S.Ct. at 1734- 35"(id., 117).

In considering the "balancing test", it was held that "where the employee speaks on matters of public concern, the government bears the burden of justifying any adverse employment action" and that:

"This burden is particularly heavy where, as here, the issue is not an isolated disciplinary action taken in response to one employee's speech, but is, instead, a blanket policy designed to restrict expression by a large number of potential speakers. To justify this kind of prospective regulation, '[t]he Government must show that the interests of both potential audiences and a vast group of present and future employees in a broad range of present and future expression are outweighed by that expression's 'necessary impact on the actual operation' of the Government." NTEU, 513 U.S. at 468, 115 S. Ct. at 1014 (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571, 88 S.Ct. at 1736)...

"'[S]peech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.') While the government has special authority to proscribe the speech of its employees , '[v]igilance is necessary to ensure that public employers do not use authority over employees to silence discourse, not because it hampers public functions but simply because superiors disagree with the content of employees' speech.' Rankin, 483 U.S. at 384, 107 S. Ct. at 2896.

"A restraint on government employee expression 'also imposes a significant burden on the public's right to read and hear what the employees would otherwise have written and said.' NTEU, 513 U.S. at 470, 115 S.Ct. at 1015. The Supreme Court has noted that '[g]overnment employees are often in the best position to know what ails the agencies for which they work; public debate may gain much from their informed opinions.' Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 674, 114 S.Ct. 1878, 1887, 128 L.Ed.2d 686 (1994)..." (id., 118- 119).

The Court found that the order, by requiring advance approval before an employee could comment, "is generally disfavored under First Amendment law because it 'chills potential speech before it happens', stating that:

"The press policies allow the agencies to determine in advance what kind of speech will harm agency operations instead of punishing disruptive remarks after their effect has been felt. For this reason, the regulations ran afoul of the general presumption against prior restraints on speech" (id., 119).

It also viewed the matter from the perspective of the reality of the relationship between employers and employees, finding that:

"Employees who are critical of the agency will naturally hesitate to voice their concerns if they must first ask permission from the very people whose judgments they call into question. Only those who adhere to the party line would view such a requirement without trepidation" (id., 120).

Again, you are not an employee, but rather an elected official. In my view, one of the responsibilities of elected officials involves speaking out on issues of concern to the public.

In generally rejecting the possibility that speech may be disruptive, it was stated that:

"The City contends that employee speech will be permitted as long as it will not interfere with the efficient and effective operations of the agencies. We do not find this standard to be sufficiently definite to limit the possibility for content or viewpoint censorship. Because the press policies allow suppression of speech before it takes place, administrators may prevent speech that would not actually have had a disruptive effect. See e.g., NTEU, 513 U.S. at 475 n.21, 115 S.Ct. at 1017 n.21 ('Deferring to the Government's speculation about the pernicious effects of thousands of articles and speeches yet to be written or delivered would encroach unacceptably on the First Amendment's protections.'). Furthermore, the standard inherently disfavors speech that is critical of agency operations, because such comments will necessarily seem more potentially disruptive than comments that 'toe[] the agency line.' Sanjour, 56 F3d at 96-97 (striking down regulation that permitted reimbursement for only those speaking engagements consistent with the 'mission of the agency' as a restriction on anti-government speech).

"The challenged regulations thus implicate all of the above concerns. By mandating approval from an employee's superiors, they will discourage speakers with dissenting views from coming forward. They provide no time limit for review to ensure that commentary is not rendered moot by delay. Finally, they lack objective standards to limit the discretion of the agency decision-maker. For these reasons we agree with the district court that 'ACS 101 and HRA 641 clearly restrict the First Amendment rights of City employees..."(id., 121).

It was emphasized by the court that the harm sought to be avoided must be real, and not merely conjectural:

"...where the government singles out expressive activity for special regulation to address anticipated harms, the government must 'demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not merely conjectural, and that the regulations will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material way.' NTEU 513 U.S. at 475, 115 S.Ct. at 1017 (quoting Turner Broad Sys. Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 512 U.S. 622, 624, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 2450, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994) (plurality opinion)). Although government predictions of harm are entitled to greater deference when used to justify restrictions on employee speech as opposed to speech by the public, such difference is generally accorded only when the government takes action in response to speech which has already taken place. NTEU, 513 U.S. at 475 n.21, 115 S.Ct. at 1017 n.21. Where the predictions of harm are proscriptive, the government cannot rely on assertions, but must show a basis in fact for its concerns" (id., 122).

In a key statement that essentially summarizes its decision, the Court found that:

"The executive orders reach more broadly to cover all information regarding any agency policy or activity. They thus have the potential to chill substantially more speech than is reasonably necessary to protect the confidential information" (id., 123) (i.e., information that is exempted from disclosure and which, pursuant to statute, cannot be disclosed ).

In my opinion, in the context of school district business, matters would be "confidential" only on rare occasions. Those situations might involve information that is derived from student records or perhaps attorney work product or records subject to the attorney-client privilege. In most instances, however, there would be no prohibition against disclosure based on a statute that forbids release of records or their contents.

The general prohibition suggested by Mr. Lambert is in my view contrary to the holding rendered in Harman. It is vague, or in the words of Harman, not "sufficiently definite"; it is prospective and "chills speech before it happens", for it does not focus on any harm that has actually occurred. In short, it stifles free speech in a manner that has been found to be unconstitutional.

What if, after an executive session, a member of the Board believes that the session or a portion of the session was improperly held? Would his or her disclosure of that opinion or the substance of the matter discussed result in a violation of law? I note, too, that Mr. Lambert referred to matters "properly discussed in executive session." Frequently executive sessions are convened for "proper" reasons, but the public body drifts into a new subject. My hope is that there will always be a member or other person present who is sufficiently knowledgeable regarding the permissible parameters of executive session and sufficiently vigilant to suggest that the executive session should end and that the body should return to an open meeting. But what if that does not happen? What if the public body rejects that person's efforts to return to the open meeting? What if there is simply an oversight and a realization after the executive session that the body should have engaged in a discussion in public? Would disclosure of a matter that should have been discussed in public but which was considered during a "properly convened" executive session constitute a violation of law?

Lastly, while there may be no prohibition against disclosure of most of the information discussed in an executive session, to reiterate a pointed offered in other opinions rendered by this office, the foregoing is not intended to suggest that such disclosures would be uniformly appropriate or ethical. Obviously, the purpose of an executive session is to enable members of public bodies to deliberate, to speak freely and to develop strategies in situations in which some degree of secrecy is permitted. Similarly, the grounds for withholding records under the Freedom of Information Law relate in most instances to the ability to prevent some sort of harm. In both cases, inappropriate disclosures could work against the interests of a public body as a whole and the public generally. Further, a unilateral disclosure by a member of a public body might serve to defeat or circumvent the principles under which those bodies are intended to operate.

Historically, I believe that public bodies were created in order to reach collective determinations, determinations that better reflect various points of view within a community than a single decision maker could reach alone. Members of those bodies should not in my opinion be unanimous in every instance; on the contrary, they should represent disparate points of view which, when conveyed as part of a deliberative process, lead to fair and representative decision making. Notwithstanding distinctions in points of view, the decision or consensus by the majority of a public body should in my opinion be recognized and honored by those members who may dissent. Disclosures made contrary to or in the absence of consent by the majority could result in unwarranted invasions of personal privacy, impairment of collective bargaining negotiations or even interference with criminal or other investigations. In those kinds of situations, even though there may be no statute that prohibits disclosure, release of information could be damaging to individuals and the functioning of government, and disclosures should in my view be cautious, thoughtful and based on an exercise of reasonable discretion.

Copies of this opinion will be forwarded to the Board of Education and Mr. Lambert.

I hope that I have been of assistance.



Robert J. Freeman
Executive Director


cc: Board of Education
Michael K. Lambert