OML-AO-4622 May 5, 2008




The staff of the Committee on Open Government is authorized to issue advisory opinions.  The ensuing staff advisory opinion is based solely upon the information presented in your correspondence.


            I have received your letters and hope that you will accept my apologies for the delay in response.  In brief, the issues that you raised involve the ability of the Rome Common Council to receive legal advice from its attorney in private.

            In this regard, as suggested in the news article attached to your letter, there are two vehicles that may authorize a public body to discuss public business in private.  One involves entry into an executive session.  Section 102(3) of the Open Meetings Law defines the phrase "executive session" to mean a portion of an open meeting during which the public may be excluded, and the Law requires that a procedure be accomplished, during an open meeting, before a public body may enter into an executive session.  Specifically, §105(1) states in relevant part that:

"Upon a majority vote of its total membership, taken in an open meeting pursuant to a motion identifying the general area or areas of the subject or subjects to be considered, a public body may conduct an executive session for the below enumerated purposes only..."

            As such, a motion to conduct an executive session must include reference to the subject or subjects to be discussed and the motion must be carried by majority vote of a public body's membership before such a session may validly be held.  The ensuing provisions of §105(1) specify and limit the subjects that may appropriately be considered during an executive session.  Therefore, a public body may not conduct an executive session to discuss the subject of its choice.

            The other vehicle for excluding the public from a meeting involves "exemptions."  Section 108 of the Open Meetings Law contains three exemptions.  When an exemption applies, the Open Meetings Law does not, and the requirements that would operate with respect to executive sessions are not in effect.  Stated differently, to discuss a matter exempted from the Open Meetings Law, a public body need not follow the procedure imposed by §105(1) that relates to entry into an executive session.  Further, although executive sessions may be held only for particular purposes, there is no such limitation that relates to matters that are exempt from the coverage of the Open Meetings Law.

            Relevant is §108(3), which exempts from the Open Meetings Law:

"...any matter made confidential by federal or state law."

            When an attorney-client relationship has been invoked, it is considered confidential under §4503 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules.  Therefore, if an attorney and client establish a privileged relationship, the communications made pursuant to that relationship would in my view be confidential under state law and, therefore, exempt from the Open Meetings Law.

            In terms of background, it has long been held that a municipal board may establish a privileged relationship with its attorney [People ex rel. Updyke v. Gilon, 9 NYS 243 (1889); Pennock v. Lane, 231 NYS 2d 897, 898 (1962)].  However, such a relationship is in my opinion operable only when a municipal board or official seeks the legal advice of an attorney acting in his or her capacity as an attorney, and where there is no waiver of the privilege by the client.

            In a judicial determination that described the parameters of the attorney-client relationship and the conditions precedent to its initiation, it was held that:

"In general, 'the privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services (iii) assistance in some legal proceedings, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client'" [People v. Belge, 59 AD 2d 307, 399, NYS 2d 539, 540 (1977)].

            Insofar as a public body seeks legal advice from its attorney and the attorney renders legal advice, I believe that the attorney-client privilege may validly be asserted and that communications made within the scope of the privilege would be outside the coverage of the Open Meetings Law.  Therefore, even though there may be no basis for conducting an executive session pursuant to §105 of the Open Meetings Law, a private discussion might validly be held based on the proper assertion of the attorney-client privilege pursuant to §108, and legal advice may be requested even though litigation is not an issue.  In that case, while the litigation exception for entry into executive session would not apply, there may be a proper assertion of the attorney-client privilege.

            There are several decisions in which the assertion of the attorney-client privilege has been recognized as a means of closing a meeting.  In Cioci v. Mondello (Supreme Court, Nassau County, March 18, 1991), the issue involved the ability of a county board of supervisors to seek the legal advice of its attorney in private, and the court stated that "Clearly, the Supervisors' discussions with the County Attorney...are exempt from the provisions of the Open Meetings Law (see POL §108(3), CPLR §4503...)".  In another decision citing §108(3), it was found that "any confidential communications between the board and its counsel, at the time counsel allegedly advised the Board of the legal issues involved in the determination of the variance application, were exempt from the provisions of the Open Meetings Law" [Young v. Board of Appeals, 194 AD2d 796, 599 NYS2d 632, 634 (1993)].

            Notwithstanding the foregoing, it has been advised by this office and held judicially that the authority to assert the attorney-client privilege as an exemption from the coverage of the Open Meetings Law is narrow.  In a decision that cited an advisory opinion of the Committee, the court in White v. Kimball (Supreme Court, Chautauqua County, January 27, 1997) found that:

"While there is no question that Executive Sessions can be conducted for proper reasons and that an exception exists under the Open Meetings Law for attorney-client privileged communications, the scope of that privilege is limited.  Once the legal advice is offered, discussions with regard to substance (e.g.) the closing date of a bus system, do not fall within the privilege of the exception.  See Exhibit C, April 8, 1996 Open Meetings Law Advisory Opinion #2595, Robert J. Freeman, Executive Director of Committee on Open government at page 4:

“I note that the mere presence of an attorney does not signify the existence of an attorney-client relationship; in order to assert the attorney-client privilege, the attorney must in my view be providing services in which the expertise of an attorney is needed and sought.  Further, if at some point in a discussion, the attorney stops giving legal advice and a public body may begin discussing or deliberating independent of the attorney.  When that point is reached, I believe that the attorney-client privilege has ended and that the body should return to an open meeting.”

            The same kind of analysis would apply in considering rights of access conferred by the Freedom of Information Law.  That statute, like the Open Meetings Law, is based upon a presumption of access.  Stated differently, all records of an agency are available, except to the extent that records or portions thereof fall within one or more grounds for denial appearing in §87(2)(a) through (j) of the Law.

            The first exception to rights of access, §87(2)(a), pertains to records that “are specifically exempted from disclosure by state or federal statute.”  Therefore, legal advice sought by a client and rendered by the client’s attorney would be exempted from disclosure pursuant to §4503 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules.

            I hope that the foregoing serves to clarify your understanding and that I have been of assistance.



                                                                                                Robert J. Freeman
Executive Director


cc: Common Council